Reasons Constituting The Renewal of Sino-American Tensions

Introduction

The inevitable rise of Sino-American tensions came at the turn of the century as co-operative forms of US-China relations broke down. In what follows, I examine the leading cause of the newly intensifying rivalry between China and America. Under the structural constraint of international anarchy, states can either take the liberal or realist approach concerning international relations. Since Nixon, America took the liberal congagement approach, hoping that China would one day democratise under the modernisation theory. However, congagement was unbalanced, and oftentimes short-term economic gains under engagement policies were prioritised over containment policies. This meant that the failure of containment policies to work with engagement policies prevented Rostow’s stages of modernisation theory from being realised, making the legitimising factor of congagement questionable. Alongside the distractions caused by the war on terror, the great economic losses in western societies compared to China in the 2000s dotcom bubble crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis, saw the magnified rise of China’s power. This led to the shift from unipolarity to bipolarity and hence the sense of liberal congagement failure, creating calls for realist containment during the Bush years. However, due to the distraction posed by the war on terror, the realist mindset would only be materialised under the Obama administration. This antagonised China, renewed Sino-American tensions and paved way to scepticism and adversarial psychology on both sides we see today. In the final sections of this essay, I examine two main areas of conflict as a result of this shift: the economy and military.

Shift from a liberal to realist approach under international anarchy

The case for the renewed Sino-American tensions lie in the shift outlook and approach from liberal to realist under the international system of anarchy and the disagreement between the two states towards why there is a shift. To China, the shift in power in the international system of anarchy from unipolarity to bipolarity caused a hostile American response due to its insecurities of being overtaken by the world's second-largest economy. To America, the shift in approach is forced upon by China due to its failure to come into accordance with the Modernisation Theory.

Hereinafter, I examine the effect this shift of viewpoint has on American policies, as well as similar countermeasures that were taken by the Chinese. Both countries are fuelled by insecurities deepened by actions taken by both parties as they spiral into the realist paradigm of I.R., where it is more important to 'win more' than to be in a 'win-win' situation, even if it means ending up 'winning' less. I will probe into what the contemporary concerns both countries have as well as the effects of this rivalry on the world, and hence, explain partly, the renewed Sino American tensions. I will also look at the economic and military issues that are brought about by the increased concerns caused by the shift in mindset.

Defining the terms: anarchy, realist and liberal, polarity

Anarchy is widely accepted as the starting point for international relations (I.R.) theory and is the understanding that there is an absence of a supranational authority that can resolve disputes among states reliably (Milner, 1991). There are two interpretations of anarchy in theory for I.R., one being a realist and another being liberal. The realist theory of I.R. asserts that states are the leading players in international politics, and they assume a "self-help" doctrine, believing that they can rely on only themselves for security (Williams and McDonald, 2018). The underlying motive of a state's behaviour in the anarchical system is survival, in which increasing the security of one state will necessarily lead to a decrease in security of other states. Thus, states are forced to continually take into account that others might have more power than them or are planning to gain more power and so, forced to do the same, leading to competition and balancing (Williams and McDonald, 2018). Because of these concerns, realists tend to believe that power is acquired through or the threat of military action, and assert that this power struggle renders nothing in I.R. such as lasting alliances or peace. The liberal theory of I.R. argues that international institutions can mitigate anarchy's constraining effects on hesitant cooperation(GRIECO, 1999). Liberals believe anarchy can be regulated with various tools, most notably: liberal democratisation, liberal economic interdependence and liberal institutionalism (Baylis and Smith, 2005). The liberal theory asserts that the existence and spread of free trade (a system where private economic agents of different states maintain an extensive exchange of goods and capital) reduce the likelihood of conflict, as "economically interdependent states are reluctant to become involved in militarised disputes out of fear that conflict disrupts trade and foreign investment and thus induces costs on the opponents" (Bussmann, 2010). The security gained by mutually beneficial trading under free-market trade allows for the idea of lasting alliances based on shared beliefs and ideas, as well as the hope for world peace even under anarchy if states seek common ground, something that the realist model lacks.

During the post-Cold War period, the world was in the condition of unipolarity marked by America's position as a peerless superpower. With China's rise, which accelerated in the mid-1990s, there was a shift in the distribution of power in the international system, and a transition away from unipolarity towards bipolarity. Bipolarity is defined by the large gap between the capabilities of the two leading states and those of the next most influential group of states. Bipolarity also does not indicate equivalence or symmetry in the composition of the capabilities of the 'duopolists'. Some might argue that the world currently has a tripolar system, with Europe being a major power, alongside the U.S. and China. However, despite having material wealth, its "political weakness and its erratic and difficult course of internal political development, particularly as regards a common foreign and defence policy" (Buzan, 2004) prevents it from reaching superpower status. Therefore, it is more likely that world politics is under a bipolar US-China system, rather than a tripolar US-China-Europe system.

The original liberal approach - congagement

At the start of China's journey to becoming a prominent power on the world stage, the U.S. was unaware of the potential 'challenger-in-the-making' and led to an approach of 'congagement', a mix between engagement and containment. This strategy was further propelled by the hopes that China would liberalise and "open up". The idea of liberalisation upon economic involvement in the capitalist world comes under Rostow's Stages of Development in the Modernisation Theory, which states that traditional societies (communist China) would democratise and become more progressive liberally as they adopt more ‘modern’ practises (capitalism). Nixon's visit to China in 1972 ended 25 years of no communication or diplomatic ties between the two countries since the communist takeover of China. In this visit to China, Nixon met with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai. The two leaders agreed to expand cultural contacts between their two nations. Nixon also established plans for a permanent U.S. trade mission in China. At the same time, China agreed to a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question, displaying engagement from the American side through the promise of cultural and economic exchange, as well as containment of China through the Taiwan question.

However, America was more leaned into the liberal view on I.R. than the realist and wanted cooperation with China instead of confrontation. The growing economic partnership, as well as American vision in Chinese potential, led to the formal recognition of the communist People's Republic of China (PRC) and severed relations with Taiwan on January 1, 1979, under the leadership of Carter. At times, containment was sacrificed for engagement, and the imbalance between the two meant economic partnership was placed before political correctness and advancement of human rights and liberal ideals. Clinton's presidential campaign was an attack on George H.W. Bush for extending trade privileges to China and granting it MFN status (most favoured nation) in the years following the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown on pro-democratic activists, accusing him of "coddling criminals." (Devroy, 2004). Since becoming president, Clinton imposed a series of conditions on the extension of China's most-favoured-nation (MFN) trade benefits. However, after one year, he acknowledged that China had not done what he requested, and he decided to extend the trade privileges despite that (Mann, 2021). Later on, Clinton signed the U.S.-China Relations Act of 2000 in October, which granted Beijing permanent normal trade relations with the United States and paved the way for China to join the WTO (World Trade Organization) in 2001 (Timeline: U.S. Relations With China 1949–2021, 2021).

Realisation of liberal failures, attempts to shift to realist mindset but distracted: China gaining strength and defies norms of democratisation under liberalism

The failures of Clinton's administration to address the imbalance in the strategy of congagement, as well as failing to pressure China to conform to liberal expectations, led to a realisation during the government of George W. Bush. At the turn of the century, the idea that security could be achieved through trade which allows for the idea of lasting alliances based on shared beliefs and ideas is diminishing as displayed by actions taken by the Chinese government, from the American perspective, which is either not 'progressive' enough, or not in the liberal framework of America. China has failed to act predictably in accordance to the modernisation theory. Actions that were 'not liberal' is evident in the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown on pro-democratic activists as well as the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995. The improvement of Sino-American relations in the late stages of Clinton's term, especially China's ascension to the WTO, led to resentful feelings from anti-China groups in the United States (Yu, 2009). This was largely amongst the blue-collar working class bloc in the US, which suffered the most from increased US-China partnership, as a result of American de-industrialisation due to industry moving to China where cheaper labour was available.

Bush's win in the presidential election was a turning point in the American approach towards China, from "Constructive Strategic Partner" to "Strategic Competitor." Security is believed to be better achieved through the betterment of one's country at the expense of the other, instead of mutually beneficial agreements. Before his win, the Congress Advisory Board of the Republican Party believed that the Clinton administration had made too many concessions to China. Thus, the new Republican administration under Bush was advised by his own party to adopt a more hard-line policy. The realisation that happened a decade ago shifted the viewpoint from liberal to realist, in a system where a supranational authority is lacking, security will be achieved more through a "self-help" doctrine, rather than a mutually beneficial one. The security gained through past cooperation has faded, and insecurity that is derived from the mechanism of cooperation - economic interdependency is having a more significant toll on both nations. In Joseph Grieco's 1988 article "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation", he wrote: "for realists, international anarchy fosters competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate even when they share common interests"(GRIECO, 1999). As a state strives to provide for its security, it will automatically be fuelling the insecurity of other states, as well as discovering those of its own. This spiral of insecurity is known as the "security dilemma" (Williams and McDonald, 2018).

However, the focus of the Bush administration was heavily shifted due to the September 11 attacks, which happened a mere eight months after Bush had taken office. Bush understood the failures of congagement but did not face it directly because of conflicts in the Middle East. He acknowledged that America could not handle war on both fronts and so decided to seek peace with China instead.

Materialising the realist mindset under the Obama administration:

The transition to the Obama administration proved pivotal. Obama’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ was based on assumptions that U.S. foreign policy had previously neglected the Asia Pacific, that Asia’s rising importance in the global economy called for the assignment of more military resources to the region in order to prevent China’s regional dominance. Obama justified the ‘Pivot to Asia’ on grounds that China, had human rights abuses, military expansionist plans, committed IP thefts and did not liberalise as expected under the Modernisation Theory.

However, Beijing saw the ‘Pivot to Asia’ as an attempt to contain China militarily and restrict its position on the world stage. This created a more aggressive China. From the perspective of the Chinese, the shift in American approach is not caused by its human rights issues, or its failure to act accordingly to the Modernisation Theory, which either does not exist or is prompted to suppress local terrorism created by American attempts to cause secessions in China through independence movements. The shift, in turn, is caused by the emergence of a bipolar world, a world America refuses to accept or allow to exist.

Firstly, the Air-Sea Battle doctrine was a plan to prepare for possible military confrontations with China and then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates openly discussed the need to counter China’s growing military capabilities. The signal received in Beijing was the United States had hostile intentions toward China and was trying to contain it militarily. The result was that the entire pivot was seen by Beijing as part of a broader effort to encircle China. Secondly, Obama presented American trade deals in Asia as a way to suppress China, publicly making a statement that the “TPP allows America - and not countries like China - to write the rules of the road in the 21st century.” (Office of the Press Secretary, 2016). Thirdly, the U.S. rejected China’s invitation to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and even objected to U.K.’s participation. If the United States had pursued the TPP by publicly emphasizing it hoped China would one day join while also joining the AIIB, the entire perception of any pivot in Beijing would have been radically different. Instead of appearing to be a strategy to undermine China it would simply appear to be an effort to take full advantage of the economic opportunities presented by Asia’s dynamic economic growth. Instead, the United States chose a path that heightened military tensions and missed out on economic opportunities.

Evidently, it was the Obama administration that acted on the failures of liberal congagement and renewed Sino-American tensions. The ‘Pivot to Asia’ failed to contain the rise of China. Instead, China became more aggressive, pressing its claims in the South China Sea. China also continues to close the gap in military capabilities with the United States. Its economy continues to grow, as does its share of global GDP. The TPP looks to be inactive in Congress, amounting to little importance, while China pursues trade deals of its own with key countries in the region. The pivot failed to achieve its key goals in Asia and antagonised China at the same time.

Both countries have different beliefs towards why the other had strayed away from the original path. To the U.S., China had developed ambitions and wants to challenge its position in the international order, while disregarding the acknowledgements to adhere and improve in liberal causes. To the Chinese, human rights are more of a political terminology the U.S. uses to paint a gloomy picture of China, in order to slow the inevitable rise of China, which the Chinese believe Americans to fear. No matter which analogy is used, the mindset of the two countries now under Xi and Trump, is different from those under Deng and Nixon, or Jiang and Clinton. The differences analysed fit closest to the differences between liberal and realist mindsets under the structural constraints of anarchy.

Renewed tensions as a result of realist ‘self-help’ doctrine

With a realist mindset in play, an attempt to decouple with the constraints of interdependency, causes both countries to look deeper into their insecurities, which are categorised as economic and military. By reviewing these factors of insecurities, we have a clearer picture of why the tensions between China and America are renewed and intensified, on top of the leading cause of anarchy and the shift in mindset.

Economic tensions resurfacing from the abandonment of congagement

Economic vulnerabilities became a flashpoint of conflict once Sino-American relations shifted from a realist to a liberal approach. Economic interdependence was minimal before China’s accession to the WTO; however, increased interdependence was not met with confrontation until recent times. At the turn of the century, the U.S. and China are in a very different economic-political landscape when compared to the early days of co-operation under Nixon and China’s opening up and reform policies under Deng. The realisation of the fault in unbalanced economics under congagement increased rivalry as the US views China more and more similar to that of the USSR, and not the economic partner China was viewed as at the start. China’s outsized economic role in the global supply chain proved to be very concerning to the U.S. since it, alongside many western powers, had its businesses thoroughly integrated into such supply chains.

The shift of American policy from liberal to realist was in part due to China failing to politically liberalise under expectations from the modernization theory. The latter seemingly seeks to both “challenge America’s overall power and influence”, ultimately displacing America as a world leader, and “shape a world that is antithetical to U.S. interests” (The Republican Study Committee, 2020). The “Chinese dream of national rejuvenation” and military and economic dominance was proposed in November 2012, at the 17th CCP Congress by China’s President Xi. This proposition drew concerns in the U.S. to a possibility that the Chinese dream might one day displace the American dream, since many believe that it is in China’s ‘centralised authoritarian nature’ to overtake the U.S. as the “world’s preeminent power”, as the USSR had tried to do so in the past (The Republican Study Committee, 2020). Evidently, U.S. concerns of being displaced are not unfounded. China has experienced rapid economic growth, being the world’s second largest economy in terms of nominal GDP ($14.14 trillion) and the largest in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) GDP ($27.31 trillion) (Bajpai, 2020). In 2000, China controlled only 4% of the global economy, and the U.S. controlled 31%. Today, China stands at 15% and the U.S. share has dropped to 24% (Vandehei, 2018). To the US, the rapid development of the Chinese economy is very alarming, especially when its centralised nature and lack of transparency makes China hard to predict.

Concerning reasons causing economic tensions, specifically, there have been claims of sabotage, IP theft and hacking from the U.S. Evidently, there was a data breach of the Office of Personal Management in 2015 supposedly by China. Moreover, America claims that between 2013-17, IP theft resulted in $1.2 trillion worth of economic damage. This is also supported by a survey in 2019, where 1 in 5 North American based companies said they had experienced Chinese IP theft (The Republican Study Committee, 2020). From China’s point of view however, the American fear of being displaced confirms the Chinese narrative that American suppression is not due to China’s illiberal system or an attempt to “modernize” China politically, but due to America’s reluctance to share power or even give way to a system perceived to work better, and that would be “Socialism with Chinese characteristics'' over “American democracy”. Evidently, America in the past, was willing to accept the inevitability of IP thefts and human rights abuses in China, just as long as China remains unthreatening, the world order being unipolar, and America makes more relative gains. This questions the underlying motives of American abandoning of congagement: whether it is to actually hold China accountable for not liberalising under expectations, IP thefts and human rights abuses; or that it is simply a display of unwillingness to share power and cohabit in a bipolar order. To China, this is evident in American suppression of 5G technology, supposedly invented by Huawei and claimed by the U.S. to be a national security threat and IP theft. The Chinese also believe that American suppression of “One Belt One Road initiative”, a plan to lift poorer countries out of poverty, is a prime example of the U.S. hoarding power, instead of liberating the poor. Yet the U.S. claims the initiative is simply a debt trap to extend Chinese influence. This is a key to the build-up of suspicion from both sides, perpetrated by rivalry under the structural constraints of the bipolar system of international anarchy.

Suspicion and concerns on both sides led to a renewed desire to reduce US-China economic interdependence in the 2010s. This process is known as decoupling, which is highly disruptive to the global economy and would require major adjustments by both countries and their economic partners around the world. The inevitable decoupling will lead to a new world order dominated by the realist mindset of suspicion, increasing tensions in the realm of economics. There have already been some changes that reflect such newly salient concerns, in the broadening sectors in which the legacy of close engagement with China is being reconsidered by the US. Evidently, American fears of the involvement of Chinese companies in the process of national infrastructure upgrading (such as 5G telecoms) led to the restriction of Huawei access to U.S. technology by adding the company to the Entity list, which consists of companies with intentions “contrary to U.S. national security and/or foreign policy interests"(Gross, 2020). This reflects growing unease about links between economic interdependence and national security (Goldstein, 2020). The manifestation of rivalry has led to an alteration of the calculation of cost and benefits derived from close co-operation with China. What would have previously seemed to be mutually beneficial are now problematic, because the US worries that China would acquire expertise that could enhance its economy, military and technology in the process of collaboration. To the U.S., “Socialism with Chinese characteristics” basically means China is combining “direct state investment, forced technology transfer, and intellectual property theft to narrow the gap between U.S. and Chinese equipment, systems and capabilities” (U.S. Department of Defense, 2020a). The U.S. has grown increasingly aware that American companies are competing with Chinese companies in an open capitalist market with an unfair advantage given to Chinese companies by state backing.

American measures have provoked similar retaliatory responses in China, which is also concerned about vulnerabilities that lie in depending on American input in crucial technologies such as the semiconductor chip (widely known as the microchip), which would hold back Beijing’s vision for China’s next stage of modernization. The response to this was manifested in the Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025) as well as the latest Chinese 5-year-plan released in October 2020, committing China to “build an entire microchip supply chain from end to end”, eventually gaining the ‘microchip independence” by 2025 (Makichuk, 2020). American restrictions on Chinese companies such as Huawei threatens to undermine China’s ability to become an international player in the field of technology. China’s response was to turn to indigenous research and development. This was to ensure the continued viability of large firms in China, as well as undermine American leverage derived from its role as a source of key technologies. The call for greater self-reliance, or in other words “autarky with Chinese characteristics” decreases the urge for both countries to collaborate and co-operate.

Ultimately, decoupling itself would reinforce national security concerns resulting from anarchy as both countries become aware of their array of vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities are highlighted as political regulations and bureaucratic red tape introduce mass inefficiencies. Rivalry, as well as the structural constraints of international anarchy, will make these issues of security more difficult to be resolved by negotiations. The disruptions and dislocations experienced in the Covid-19 pandemic may act as a cautionary tale illustrating the possible implications for a globalized order in the event of US-China rivalry under the shadow of anarchy developing into full-scale decoupling (Goldstein, 2020).

Renewed military contestation

The Cold War has taught the world that mutually assured destruction meant nuclear deterrence acts as the core of strategic logic, setting out a clear focus on preventing escalation of a crisis to a general war. Yet, military tensions resurface due to the diminishment of nuclear and traditional deterrence under the structural constraints of international anarchy and a realist mindset dominating foreign policy in a bipolar world order.

Under nuclear deterrence, neither side can eliminate weapons of mass destruction with certainty and that the fear of catastrophic consequences caused by said weapons outweighs the temptation to act upon ambition and plans that claim to deliver meaningful victory. It is argued that the decision to use such weapons is reactionary (i.e. only triggered by the adversary deciding to use them) (Craig, 2020), hence, the risk of a war between the U.S. and China is low, no matter how intense tensions become. Yet, international anarchy meant the potential return of arms race. China has launched more ballistic missiles (U.S. Department of Defense, 2020b) for testing and training in 2019 than the rest of the world combined and the Pentagon predicts China to double its nuclear arsenal in a decade’s time (Mastro, 2020). The US has also taken action, such as developing more effective hypersonic missiles, provoking China to display its DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle (France-Presse, 2020).

This development is due to two factors. Firstly, the increased concerns over a state’s own insecurities in a bipolar world dominated by the realist mindset draws attention to the capabilities and intentions of their most prominent military adversary, which induces exaggerated fears, leading to the idea that relative advantages matter. This causes decision makers to hedge against the possibility that real-world confrontations may not conform with the expectations that deterrent effect works (Goldstein, 2020). In addition, the massive amounts of resources in possession of superpowers, US-China alike, means they have the luxury to act upon such unlikely and remote yet conceivable scenarios, perpetrated by the current system of rivalry. Evidently, this mistake has been made in the past, with the U.S. and the USSR having built-up arsenals exceeding the forces needed for an effective deterrence.

Secondly, bipolarity means that there is only one rival, making it the benchmark for the superpower’s standing on the world stage. This causes rivalrous comparisons to be readily drawn, shaping policies and rhetoric that raises patriotic interest in national defense, promoting more spending on weapons leading to strategic arms build-ups that are equivocal and genuine at the same time, designed to intimidate the opponent. This is evident in the U.S., with bipartisan support in Congress amongst Democrats and Republicans for the National Defense Authorization Act 2018, increasing defense spending by 18% at 108 billion USD (Military budget of the United States, n.d.). Similarly, in China, the national defense budget increased in 2018 by 8.1% at 175 billion USD (CNBC, 2018).

Though a nuclear-arms race experienced in the Cold War has not yet been replicated in the current rivalry between the U.S. and China, bipolarity encourages this notion of wasteful and excessive military spending. Evidently, there is a shift in America’s focus on nuclear deterrence from Russia to China. The withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty of 1987 (INF) is justified by the Trump administration on grounds of Russian violations, but more importantly, China’s non-involvement in nuclear restriction while the US is prevented from acting on the growing threat posed by the PLA intermediate-range arsenal in Asia. Moreover, the Trump administration proposed to include China in the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) which is to be expired in February 2021. Washington’s change in stance is an indication that China’s capabilities are becoming an integral part of America’s calculation of the adequacy of its own nuclear capabilities.

Another key influence of the emerging military rivalry between the U.S. and China is the advancement of cyber technology. This weakens traditional deterrence. The effectiveness of the military is dependent on virtual control via the network, which is more vulnerable than traditional military that is dependent on physical access. This increases the threat of sabotage and the ability of an opponent to disrupt one’s ability to coordinate military actions and assess threats by means of hacking. If military control is compromised, such as control over space satellites, weapons and weapon delivery systems, nuclear deterrence is weakened and its robustness reduced. This increases the incentive to take pre-emptive actions, which creates a source of instability; and decreases the incentive to act in a compromising, patient and restrained manner that would have aided de-escalation in order to facilitate crisis management.

Therefore, under the structural constraints of international anarchy and a realist mindset, both sides are extremely aware of these vulnerabilities and this increases the incentive to take pre-emptive actions as well as the excessive deployment of traditional weapons, hence heightening tensions and perpetrating rivalry between the U.S. and China.

China has also seen a change in their deterrent strategy. Beijing had had a “doctrinal embrace of a simple deterrent strategy that requires only a modest arsenal to carry out retaliatory strikes” (Goldstein, 2020). Under previous leaders such as Mao and Deng, military modernization is subordinate to more pressing domestic concerns such as economic and political needs. However, recent changes saw China adopting a more forward approach in making military modernization a priority, such as the construction of man-made islands known as the Fiery Cross Reef situated in the South China Sea, in an attempt to display regional dominance and reinforcing the nine-dash-line claim. Economic and technological progress will make more resources available for investment in military capabilities. This puts into question whether China’s nuclear restraint and commitment to modesty will endure, especially when rivalry with the U.S. deepens.

Ultimately, the nature of a bipolar world creates doubts towards strategic logic and the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence; it also creates animosity due to rivalrous comparisons readily drawn by a world which refuses to accept a stable bipolar system and believes that countries strive to become the sole superpower and establish a unipolar world order. The erosion of compromise, concession, co-operation and collaboration due to suspicion in the U.S., as well as the increase in abilities to modernise the military due to economic and technological growth in China shows how military contestation and the weakened deterrent effect contributes to the renewed Sino-American tensions.

Conclusion:

At the turn of the century, we saw great changes to the relationship between U.S. and China, with respects to Washington abandoning its original stance of congagement with the rise of China as a possible threat and Beijing’s increasingly prominent position on the world stage caused by its tremendous growth in economy and technology. The liberal mindset that allowed for congagement in the late 20th century was replaced by a realist mindset that reacts to international anarchy by rivalry. This shift manifests itself in economic and military contestation. It makes clear that we are probably not on the path to global ideological contestation, full economic decoupling, as well as military interventions in proxy wars. Nonetheless, though the influences that shape the modern-day rivalry is distinctive to our damaging Cold War past with the USSR, it also shares some uncanny similarities and more unfortunately, introduces some new and unsettling conflicts, resulting in the risk of miscalculations and the crises that may lie ahead.

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